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Why	Britain	should	allow	the	UK	and	EU	Parliaments
to	talk	after	Brexit
Contrary	to	the	aims	of	the	Political	Declaration,	the	UK	government	has	refused	to	agree	to	co-operation	between
the	UK	and	EU	Parliaments.	Davor	Jancic	(Queen	Mary	University	of	London)	says	this	is	not	just	misguided
and	antagonistic,	but	breaks	with	a	tradition	of	inter-parliamentary	co-operation	that	long	predates	the	EU.
One	of	the	surprising	outcomes	of	the	third	round	of	UK-EU	negotiations	on	a	future	relationship	is	the	UK’s	refusal
to	agree	to	post-Brexit	inter-parliamentary	cooperation.	This	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	sovereignty,	diplomacy
and	the	rule	of	law.	But	the	government’s	approach	reflects	an	authority-asserting	ethos,	and	is	as	flawed	as	it	is
troubling.
MEPs	debate	the	UK-EU	Withdrawal	Agreement	on	29	January	2020.	Photo:	European
Parliament.	CC-BY-4.0:	©	European	Union	2020	–	Source:	EP
Here	is	why.	First,	if	the	intention	is	to	shield	new-found	sovereignty	against	EU	influence	in	an	infelicitous	crusade
to	take	back	control,	that	is	unconvincing.	It	flouts	the	objectives	agreed	in	both	versions	of	the	Political	Declaration,
which	encourages	the	establishment	of	a	dialogue	between	the	UK	Parliament	and	the	European	Parliament	(EP)
enabling	them	to	share	views	and	expertise	where	they	see	fit.	It	also	goes	against	the	preferences	of	these
parliaments.	In	a	resolution	adopted	in	February	2020,	the	EP	called	for	the	setting	up	of	a	joint	parliamentary	body
whose	job	would	be	to	monitor	the	implementation	of	the	future	relationship	agreement.
The	value	of	parliamentary	diplomacy	after	Brexit	has	been	recognised	in	Westminster	on	multiple	occasions	too.	In
March	2019,	for	instance,	the	House	of	Lords	argued	in	favour	of	establishing	a	UK-EU	Joint	Parliamentary
Committee	even	before	the	conclusion	of	negotiations.	From	a	broader	perspective,	these	proposals	follow	the
pattern	of	most	international	parliamentary	institutions	that	currently	operate	around	the	world	at	both	bilateral	and
multilateral	levels.	As	one	recent	study	shows,	with	few	exceptions,	they	serve	as	deliberative	forums	rather	than
decision-making	arenas.	Any	Euro-British	parliamentary	body	would	only	have	a	consultative	role.	It	would	not	have
the	power	to	adopt	legally	binding	acts	or	be	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European
Union.
Second,	if	the	rejection	of	inter-parliamentary	institutionalisation	is	merely	a	negotiating	tactic	within	a	wider
diplomatic	strategy,	this,	although	conceivable,	is	also	unpersuasive.	This	is	not	a	contentious	area	of	future	UK-EU
governance	and	certainly	not	one	where	antagonism	is	helpful.	Instead	of	demonstrating	good	will,	an
unnecessarily	adversarial	approach	risks	further	chipping	away	whatever	trust	remains	between	the	two	sides.
LSE Brexit: Why Britain should allow the UK and EU Parliaments to talk after Brexit Page 1 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-05-20
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/05/20/why-britain-should-allow-the-uk-and-eu-parliaments-to-talk-after-brexit/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Not	only	is	this	a	poor	decision	at	a	crucial	time,	it	is	one	that	sends	the	wrong	signal	to	Britain’s	partners	abroad.
The	unwillingness	to	formalise	a	legislative	dialogue	with	one	of	the	world’s	most	influential	polities	and	one	with
which	the	UK’s	legal	system	is	so	highly	intertwined,	conflicts	with	the	logic	of	a	Global	Britain	eager	to	rekindle
global	connections.	What	should	Singapore,	Canada	or	Japan	think	of	the	British	commitment	to	internationalism
and	democracy	if	the	expansion	of	lawmakers’	networks	is	not	welcomed?
Even	worse,	brushing	legislators’	transnational	role	aside	is,	inadvertently,	quite	un-British	because	it	collides	with
Westminster’s	long-standing	but	little	known	tradition	of	openness	to	global	governance.	In	fact,	the	‘first	father’	who
initiated	the	founding	back	in	1889	of	the	oldest	international	parliamentary	institution	in	the	world,	the	Inter-
Parliamentary	Union	(IPU),	was	a	British	Labour	MP	and	Nobel	Peace	Prize	laureate,	William	Randal	Cremer.	Both
Houses	of	Parliament	have	since	then	actively	and	fruitfully	engaged	within	the	IPU.	It	is	this	spirit	of	good
neighbourliness	and	good	global	citizenship	that	should	be	a	model	for	post-Brexit	UK.	If	the	government’s	view	is
that	parliamentarians	can	always	talk	informally,	this	is	unsatisfactory	because	institutionalised	forms	of	cooperation
provide	structure,	regularity,	visibility	and	a	sense	of	trust-building,	which	uncoordinated	ad	hoc	contacts	do	not.
Third,	the	government	is	unwilling	to	share	the	foreign	affairs	powers	it	enjoys	under	the	royal	prerogative,	even
when	it	comes	to	benevolent	but	otherwise	democratically	beneficial	inter-parliamentary	collaboration.	The	UK’s
official	approach	to	future	relationship	negotiations	deceptively	evokes	a	sense	of	constitutional	togetherness	where
it	states	that	international	relations	remain	‘the	responsibility	of	the	UK	Government	and	the	UK	Parliament’.	Yet	the
logic	of	clear	separation	between	Whitehall’s	and	Westminster’s	spheres	of	influence	is	inherent	in	Brexit-related
legislation.	Encouraged	by	his	landslide	victory	in	the	2019	general	election,	Boris	Johnson	repealed	the	MPs’	rights
under	the	European	Union	(Withdrawal)	Act	2018	which	would	have	empowered	them	to	approve	the	framework	for
the	future	UK-EU	relationship.	Similarly,	had	the	initial	European	Union	(Withdrawal	Agreement)	Bill	succeeded,
MPs	would	also	have	gained	the	right	to	approve	the	objectives	for	the	future	relationship.	On	the	contrary,	the
government	now	has	a	largely	free	hand	to	negotiate	with	the	EU.	Apart	from	parliamentary	debates	during	the
transition	period,	Westminster	remains	within	the	confines	of	the	negative	resolution	process,	which	originates	from
a	nearly	100-year	old	Ponsonby	rule,	now	codified	in	the	Constitutional	Reform	and	Governance	Act	2010.
This	may	be	a	discomfortingly	literal	exercise	of	the	constitutional	principle	requiring	the	government	to	command
rather	than	earn	the	support	of	the	majority	in	the	House	of	Commons,	but	Brexit	is	not	only	a	crisis.	It	represents
an	opportunity	to	rethink	Parliament’s	rights	of	participation	in	international	affairs,	including	treaty-making	and
parliamentary	diplomacy.	These	developments	are	concerning	in	light	of	the	rule	of	law	because	they	hamper
participation,	transparency	and	oversight.	Given	the	magnitude	of	Brexit’s	economic	and	constitutional
consequences	for	the	UK,	this	is	democratically	unsound.
Finally,	the	standoffish	attitude	ignores	the	many	benefits	of	formal	inter-parliamentary	relations.	In	Brexit
negotiations,	the	EP	has	risen	to	the	status	of	a	‘quasi-negotiator’	owing	to	its	resolutions	and	impact-oriented
institutional	structures	such	as	its	steering	group	and	Brexit	coordinator.	Beyond	this,	the	EP	has	become	an
important	veto	player	in	EU	foreign	relations,	one	that	all	major	global	powers,	such	as	the	US	and	China,	try	to
build	stronger	ties	with.	This	is	not	just	for	reasons	of	friendship	and	socialisation.	Transnational	legislative	forums
and	networks	are	invaluable	sources	of	information	and	act	as	vehicles	for	policy	debates	and	norm	promotion.	As
such,	they	can	have	positive	effects.	The	dialogues	they	generate	enrich	domestic	political	discussions	and	can
help	to	prevent	frictions,	reduce	tensions	and	iron	out	misunderstandings.
Significantly,	this	would	ensure	that	after	Brexit	the	voice	of	the	people,	acting	through	their	elected	representatives,
is	heard	in	Brussels.	This	would	in	turn	give	the	UK	a	periodic	insight	into	EU	affairs	as	well	as	a	degree	of	indirect
influence.	This	can	then	better	equip	MPs	and	peers	for	the	exercise	of	democratic	control	back	in	the	Palace	of
Westminster.	For	a	political	party	whose	previous	government	was	found	in	contempt	of	parliament,	more
transparency	–	not	less	–	should	be	a	priority,	and	legislative	dialogues	foster	this.	All	of	these	reasons	demonstrate
why	the	Prime	Minister	should	change	course	and	embrace	formal	parliamentary	liaison	as	a	vital	component	of	the
future	UK-EU	relations.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.
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